pushed on to Haines BluíF which the enemy had couimencetl evacuating the day before, and a party remained behind in the hope of destroying or taking away a large amoimt of ammunition on hand.
Wlien tliey saw tlie gunboats they came out and left everything in good order. Their guns fell into our hands.
The works at Haines Blnff are very fonnidable. There are 14 of the heaviest kind of mounted 8 & 10 inch and TA inch rifled cannon, with ammunition enough to last a long siege. As the gim carriages might again fall into the hands of the enemy, I liad tliem burned, blew up the magazine and destroyed the works generally.
I also bunit up the encampments which were permanently and reniarkably well constnieted looking as if tlie rebels intended to stay for some time. Tlie works ajid encampments covered many acres of ground and the fortifications and rifle pits proper of Haines Blufî e.xtendcd alíont u uiile and a quarter. Such a network of defenses I never saw, Tlie rebels were a ye^ir in constructing them and all were rendered useless in an hour. ,
So it was that a single news release incorrectly gave credit to the gunboats for the capture of Haynes Bluff. It was the 4th Iowa Cavalry that deserved the recognition.
THE ANTISLAVERY MOVEMENT IN IOWA
by James Connor 0e5 Moines, Iowa
Mr. Connor is a graduate student at Drake University. The following is the first portion of a two-part article which examines the evolution of Iowa's attitudes on the great moral controversy of slavery. It is an edited version of Mr. Connor's master's thesis in American History.
Part H of "The Antislavery Movement In Iowa" will appear in the fall issue of the Annals. Sources will be given at tiiat time.
Part P
If one predominant thread could be picked from the tangled skein of social and political preoccupations in the middle decades of 19th century America, that thread would probably be the slavery controversy. No State or territory, no citizen, no level of govemnient could escape involvement with the question. It served as a focus for national issues. Americans inevitably examined such problems as intemal improvements, foreign policy and territorial organization in light of tlieir effects on the various sections of the country; and at the root of the basic sectional dilemma was the economic, political and social reality of the slave system.
Men might attempt to escape entanglement in the whole issue, but lasting immunity was totally impossible. The question had an appalling habit of following in the train of any territorial immigration, and it proved itself a hardy traveler, dropping roots easily in virgin land. In few territories was this inevitable insistency of the slavery controversy so graphically exemplified as in the early history of Iowa. This State was pulled irresistably into the very vortex of the great contention, no matter how much its citizenry might wish to avoid it.
THE PROBLEM THROUGH OTHER EYES
The land comprising Iowa, resting between the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, was long the uncontested domain of various Indian tribes. It came into the territorial claims of the United States as part of the extensive Louisiana Purchase, and as such, it immediately and unavoidably became involved in the slavery question.
The entire Louisiana Territory fell first under tlie jurisdiction of the governor of Indiana, and as that area was part of the Old Northwest Territory and thus expressly forbidden to house slavery, the natural assumption was that the new land would likewise be free-soil. Such an assumption was quickly proven untenable, howe\er, since the institution ah-eady flourished in the French-settled delta lands at the mouth of the Mississippi. In 1804 a commission of judges under Indiana's Governor William Henry Harrison met in St. Loids to divide tbe buge new acquisition into districts. Tliis commission, viewing slavery's entrenchment as a fait accompli, ruled tbat the entire territory was open to the system. Thus, from its inception, Iowa was involved in the slavery question, and this long before any white man ever dreamed of settling there. However, 1804 was not a year of agitation over the expansion of the South's "peculiar institution," and Americans gave little thought to the implications of the decision rendered by Harrison's commission. Not until 1820 iind the passage of the Missouri Conipromisc would the question of slavery in the Louisiana Territory surface as a source of contention. That landmark decision determined the nature of Iowa's early settlement. Missouri gained admission to the Union as a slave-state and all the land north of 36 degrees 30 feet, an area including Iowa, was declared free. However, the solution provided by the Missouri Compromise was largely academic since Iowa still remained virgin territory.
Then, in September 1832, Black Hawk, the charismatic rebel chieftain of the Sac and Fox Indians, suffered defeat at the hands of an American force under General Winfield Scott, and was pressured into signing away a slice of his tribal lands along the west bank of tlie Mississippi River. This fifty-mile-wide strip was opened to white settlement on June 1, 1833, and once tbe restless American immigration began, the Indians were pushed inexorably back.
For the first three years of Iowa's frontier history, Michigan Territory exercised jurisdiction over it. Then, in 1836, this parent territory achieved Statehood and the reins passed to Wisconsin. On July 4, 1838, Iowa gained territorial status in its own right, and Statehood followed on Dec. 28, 1846.
During the entire period of settlement and evolving political autonomy there was no apparent question of Iowa's official attitude on slavery. The Missouri Compromise dictated Iowa to be free-soil, and its settlement proceeded accordingly. Yet the involvement of the frontier settlers could not be so easily disposed. Iowa received immigrants from aU sections of the country, and these pioneers brought their home-grown attitudes with them, regardless of any predetermined political arrangements. Furthermore, the whole concept of Negro bondage was far more complicated than a simple "thou shalt" or "thou shalt not possess slaves in this land."
The Missouri Compromise simply could not dictate men's attitudes, and attitudes are the agents which determine a people's response on any moral and social question. The key, then, to understanding the nature of Iowa's involvement with the slavery question lies in recognizing the dominant attitudes of the population at large throughout the State's entire antebellum history.
Previous students of this subject have settled rather unanimously on a single thesis, which Joel Sibley best expressed in his article, "Prosalvery Sentiment in Iowa, 1838-1861." Basically the position of Sibley and his colleagues was:
Iowa's antebellum history ean be di\ided into three different eras. During tlie first period, lasting until about 1846, great support for slavery existed; in the second period, lasting until 1854, the state underwent a transition; in the final period Iowa took its place in the roster of antislavery states. Tliis gradually changing opinion was due in the main to the makeup of the population.B asically, this represents the body of historiography on the subject. The position taken was that Iowa moved from proslavery to antisla\ery sentiments between 1833 and 1861. This shift occurred Ix^cause Southem immigrants, who initially influenced State attitudes, ciime gradually to be displaced by more abolitionist-minded settlers.
All these variations on the theme of early Iowa being a haven for proslavery attitudes hinged on tiie contention that Southern-oriented settlers intiaUy dominated the population. The only departure from tliis line of thinking came with the additional note ijy Sibley that tlie nascent proslavery outlook was also influenced by Üie fact that, until the coming of the railroads, Iowa's only reliable outlet for goods was south dowii the Mississippi.
' Joel H. Sibley, "Prosiavery Sentiment In Iowa, 1833-186L." Iowa Journal of Hi.'itory and PoHtics. LV (October, 1957) , 289.
Reputable historians would not endorse this theme of population shifts determining an attitude shift without offering proofs to support it. They do, in fact, submit considerable evidence.
The first evidence was fhe recorded nativity of the State's earliest territorial representatives. Wlien Iowa District was a part of the Wisconsin Territory, that parent area allowed it 18 delegates to the territorial assembly. In 1836 Iowa held its first election and ehose those 18. Eight of the men selected were from free States, eight were former slave-state residents and two were from Ireland. More importantly, four of the eight free-staters came from the border States where a man's position on slavery might lean either way. That Iowa's first electorate chose predominantly Southern-bom delegates, for Sibley and company, suggested an estimable Southern population in the area.
In addition to the examination of the lineage of Iowa's first representatives, some historians, notably F. I. Heniott, chose to offer the naHvity of its territorial governors as another deductive proof of their thesis. There were only tliree chief executives in Iowa during the territorial period, Robert Lucas (18.38-1841), John Chambers (1841-1845), and James Clarke (1845-1846). Herriott, however, noted significantly that the first two, Lucas and Chambers, were Southerners, Virginia and Kentucky respectively.Î n further support of the thesis alleging Southern influence in early Iowa, established historigraphy offers the election of senators as additional evidence. The first two U. S. senators chosen by the State, Augustus Caesar Dodge and Ceorge Wallace Jones, exhibited a suspiciously proSouthern bias in Congress. As Herriott pointed out. Dodge and Jones were the only "Northern" senators, save one from Pennsylvania, who could boast voting botli against the Wilmot Proviso and for the Fugitive Slave Law in the Compromise of 1850. Furthermore, Jones, bom in soutliem " F. I. Herriott, "Whence Came the Pioneers of Iowa?" Annals of loua, VII (June, 1906) , 458-459.
Indiana, was long a close personal friend of Jefferson Da\Ts and exchanged a warm correspondenc;e with him.
The final, most convincing item of this deductive genre is an excerpt from an 1854 letter which newly-elected Iowa governor, James W. Crimes, wTote to Salmon P. Chase. As edited by Herriott, the governor's letter declared:
The Southem half of our State is strongly pro-slavery, but I tliink we will be ahle to carry a majority with iis for free principles. . . . The north third of our state will be to Iowa politically what the Western Rescrx-e is to Ohio,Ĥ erriott found this excerpt terribly significant in supporting his thesis. He maintained:
The implications plainly are: first, people of Sontheni sympathies, if not Southem lineage numerically prevailed in Iowa up to 1856; second, the same was tnic of Southern Ohio; and third, the opponents of slavery, if they were to win . . . had to depend upon tlie division of the Southem residents of Iowa.'* In short, Herriott claimed that Crimes' letter neatly exemphfied the general thesis of early pro-Southern (hence, proslavery) attitudes in Iowa. However, this letter and the other foregoing deductive proofs of the established thesis were used only because census reports during those early years did not include information on the section of nativity of Iowa's citizenry. But from 18.50 to 1860 such information was recorded, and Herriott did extensive research to compile that data.
Since the decade 18.50-1860 supposedly witnessed the transition from proslavery to antislavery attitudes, and since established historiography holds that shiftijig immigration patterns determined that transition, then the natural expectation is tliat the census materials for those years indicate a steady dechne in the percentage of Southembom or Soutliem-oriented residents in Iowa, and, conversely, a steady rise in Eastern and Northeastern elements. This is exactly what Herriott found. This, then, rested the case for established his tori graphy. It contended that since Southern-horn native.s would logically bring proslavery biases to Iowa when they came, then the State was initially proslavery since deductive evidence points to a Southern-oriented citizenry prior to 1850. It maintained that Iowa shifted gradually to an antislavery stance as new waves of immigrants from the East displaced the older Southern element, and Herriott's census compilations appear to back that contention. On the whole, the thesis seems cogent, logical and well documented.
Yet there exists a certain tenuousness to tliis thesis. First, a cursory glance at antebellum Iowa history reveals events and situations which stand in glaring contradiction to the accepted work. The evidence offered by Herriott, Sibley and company is itself op<m to criticism.
A closer look at the census information reveals certain figures which refuse to fit neatly into the pattern suggested by the accepted thesis. New Englanders, the group logically e.vpected to exercise the greatest antislavery influence in Iowa, were never a significant proportion of the population. In the transition decade, 1850-1860, their percentagê rose only 1.2 percent, from 3.3 percent to 415 percent. The next most strident group would probably hail from the Middle States, and that element increased its influence only about four percent-from 14.4 percent to 18.1 percent. Lastly, the 8.6 peroent drop in the Southem-bom segment of Iowa's population was made up not only by a growing Eastern immigration, but by the rising proportion of native Iowans.
This re-examination of Herriott's work does not negate his entire thesis. However, it does suggest the need to avoid a blind acceptance of it, and it also indicates that the deductive evidence might stand closer inspection as well.
As to the States of nati\'ity of Iowa's first delegates to the Wiseonsin Assembly, there is no question. HowevCT, the unfortunate absence of all records concerning the selection of those men demands that some caution be exercised in drawing conclusions from that selection. While logic presupposes that a seetioniilly fragmented population, as Iowa undoubtedly had in 1836, would likely choose representatives who reflected its own background, such a presupposition has its weaknesses. For example, two of the 18 assemblymen chosen were from Ireland, but it is a bit far-fetched to assume that Iowa was one-ninth Irish in 1836.
Then there is the matter of the three territorial govemors. Iowa Territory's first two chief executives, Robert Lucas and John Chambers, were indeed Southemers. But again the implications drawn from this fact are open to criticism. These men were the political appointees of the Presidents under whom they served. The established historiography submitted no evidence that any of the govemors received his appointment because the President wanted to give Iowa a chief executive who reflected its population make-up.
On the question of the congressional records of Senators A. C. Dodge and Ceorge Jones, the accepted historians stand even more plainly exposed to rebuttal. It is true that the two senators voted for proposals generally favorable to the South, but they did so for reasons totally di-A'orced from proslavery convictions on their part. Neither made any secret of his antislavery beliefs.
In Neither of these passages allows much chance of mistaking the speaker as a proslavery advocate.
Criticism of the work of established historians indicates flaws in those foregoing studies, and suggests the possible need of revisionism. To do so requires the presentation of hard evidence which contradicts existing historiography. Such evidence does exist. This documented material not only tends to refute the contention that Southerners dominated early Iowa settlement, but it also hits directly at the basic axiom underlying the entire traditional thesis, that Southern-oriented immigrants were by definition proslavery.
Research actually indicates that many immigrants coming out of slave States saw Iowa as a haven from a system they despised. They did not bring home-grown proslavery sentiments with them, but precisely the oppasite convictions. Early pioneers like the Salem Quakers, David Rorer and James C. Jordan are but a few representatives of this Southern-bom antislavery element. ' Ibid., p. 1716.
The Quaker settlement of Salem sprang up in Soutlieastem Iowa in 1835. Founded by Virginia Friends who had come to the State expressly to escape contaet with the institution of slavery, the little town early demonstrated its convictions by forcing a slave-owniiig brother to dispose of his human property. Although the entire population of the village was apparently imbued with antLslavery sentiments, a segment of tlie citizenry opted for a greater militancy than its brethren by opening a depot on the famed Underground Railroad.
Attorney David Rorer is another example of antislavery attitudes driving a Southem-bom emigrant to Iowa's free soil. Also bom and raised in Virginia, Rorer practiced law in Arkansas and was an admitted slave-owner there. In the fall of 1835, however, he freed-not sold-his slaves and set out for Iowa. As an attorney in his new home, Rorer eventually ser\'ed as counsellor in two of the State's most famous fugitive slave cases.
Des Moines' future State Senator, James C. Jordan, gave the most militant expression to antislavery sentiment in the Southem-bom segment of Iowa's population. Another Virginian, Jordan spent his early years as a professional slave-catcher, tracking down and retuming fugitive slaves. These activities so disgusted him that once in Iowa he did a complete about-füce and became chief conductor on the Polk county branch of the Underground Railroad.
While the above Southemers were clearly antislavery in attitude, census reports would list them merely as slavestate immigrants. No chapter in those statistical volumes devoted itself to cataloguing a people's convictions.
So then, the foregoing historiography stands not only criticized but partially contradicted. However, beyond contradicting the established thesis there exists ihe larger challenge of determining just what course Iowa did take on the slavery question. Only a general review of the State's entire antebellum response to the institution can answer tíiat question properly. From such a review, a patttTn emerges which not only explains Iowa's evolving attitudes on the disruptive controversy, but also resolves the apparent contradictions whieli arise from the various incidents of the State's history relating to slavery.
Comprehensive research indicates that Iowa's population did not shift from proslavery to antislavery leanings, but was imbued from the first with basic feelings of hostility to the system. \Vliat tlie established historiography mistook for early proslavery sentiment was actually a desire to escape involvement in the controversy, coupled with a detennination to abide hy Constitutional dictates and ease sectional hostilities.
THE ERA OF ESCAPISM: 1833-1854
The Senator from Louisiana lives near the mouth of the great river of the West, and I many miles above him, on the same river. It is due to candor that I should tell him I am against his black boys-that is, 1 want none of tlicin, nor anything to do with them. But sir, just so far as tlicy have entered into the Constitution of the United States, and so far as th'^'y enter into the question of State rights and so\ereiíínty of the people, I am for them; I am for enacting just such laws as will hold the Senator and myself together as friends tn all times to come.* With these words, Iowa's Senator A. C. Dodge justified his impending affirmative vote on the various acts which would embody the Compromise of 1850. The statement is undoubtedly the clearest and most concise condensation of his State's governing attitude which could possibly be found in one place. It neatly summarized every facet of the corporate sentiments of pre-1854 Iowa. All the threads are there and can be precisely enumerated: the desire to escape from dealing with slavery and Blacks, a conscientious detennination to abide by Constitutional dictates and an almost obsessive desire to eoneiliate and soothe ruffled Southern sensibilities. It is perhaps symbolic that this revealing pronouncement should have been issued during the Compromise debates. A review of those pre-1854 episodes which touched upon slavery and the Negro illustrates fully how that triad of attitudes, escapism. Constitutionalism and conciliation, motivated Iowa's response in each instance.
In the annals of "official" Iowa during her territorial period, three events occurred whidi give indications of the State's slavery sentiments. While two of these three support the revisionist opinion that the new frontier district was basically antislavery, the tliird is substance for established historiography. This latter example of supposedly proslavery thinking on the official level was tlie passage in the Territorial Assembly of Iowa's first and only Black Code. Entitled "An Act to Regulate Blacks and Mulattoes," the Code cleared the fledghng territorial legislature on Jan. 21, 1839, seven months after Iowa had become an independent political entity. It first provided that no Black or mulatto could reside in the territory without possessing a court certificate attesting to his freedom and posting a $500 bond to assure that he would not become a criminal or a county charge. TTien it declared that any Negro or mulatto who failed to post bond could be hired out by the county for six months, and the money derived then be applied to the bond.
Section 5 of the Code secured any slaveholder traveling through the territory from loss of his property, and Section 6 allowed any person claiming ownership of a Negro or mulatto simply to give proof of his claim before a judge or justice of the peace in order to have the Black arrested and delivered to the claimant. These last two articles were to be of decisive importance in a subsequent action invoU'ing official Iowa in the slavery controversy, namely tlie Ralph Case argued before the Territorial Supreme Court.
The Black Code, the final analy.sis, was probably not the result of proslavery leanings in the Iowa legislature. It is much more likely that a native sense of racism influenced the passage of the repressive law. The signifiaint point in all this is the realization that racism and proslavery sentiments were not necessarily identical.
The "Ralph Case" occurred almost simultaneously with the passage of the Black Code by Iowa, and was just as highly significant in illuminating official slavery attitudes. In the early 1830s, a Missouri slave-owner named Montgomery had allowed one of his slaves, known only as Ralph, to come to Iowa and work in the lead mines at Dubuque.
An agreement between the two provided that Ralph would save enough from his wages to gradually purchase bis freedom, Howe\er, the slave could barely earn enough to keep body and soul together, and he naturally forfeited the payments to his master. By 1838 Montgomery had lost patience and hired two slave-catchers to come to Iowa and retrieve his reneging property. The stage was set for a landmark legal battle.
Wlien the news of Ralph's arrest became known, an antislaver)' Irishman named Alexander Butterworth hurried to obtain a writ of habeas corpus to halt the extradition. The case was soon brought liefore Thomas S. Wilson, Judge of the District Court of Dubuque and Associate Justice of the Territorial Supreme Court. Apparently sensing the importance of the case for future decisions, Wilson transferred the hearing to a full seating of tlie Supreme Court the following summer. In July 1839, the Black miner stood before the imposing bench of Chief Justice Charles Mason and his two colleagues.
Although how be came to be involved in the case is unknown, the man representing Ralph was the former Arkansas slave owner, David Rorer. The defense he offered was most inflammatory for a territory which established historians would label proslavery. In addition to certain legal arguments, Rorer maintained:
David Rorer
The claimant [Montgüinery] cannot possess any natural right to remove the petitujner lo wliere lie niay, by the aid of htmian law, be reduced again to slavt-ry-for such a state is declared to be "repugnant to reason and the principles of Natural Law." (See Biac. Com. Vol. 1st, p. 423.) And still stronger is the language of much earlier and Iiigher authority;-in the divine writings of Moses, it is said, "Thou shalt "not deli\er unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee," (22nd chap. Deut. 15th verse.)" Footnote No. 9 appears on page ,3.56, When the evidence was all in, the Court delivered a unanimous decision. As written by Chief Justice Mason, the tribunal ruled that Ralph should be set free. The justices agreed with Rorer that the Black Iowan had been given pennission to come to the free-soil territory and therefore could not be classified as a fugitive slave. Then, if not a fugitive, the Missouri Compromise's ban on slavery in Iowa disallowed any other chance of Montgomery's recovering his slave. As for the Black Code's provision that a Negro post a certificate of freedom and a S500 bond, Rorer reasoned successfully that Ralph's residence in Iowa prior to the Code's passage relieved him of that responsibility.
The legal liberation of Ralph is perhaps more than locally interesting because of the remarkable similarity in form to the Dred Scott appeal before the U. S. Supreme Court 18 years later. Significantly, Iowa's judiciary ruled in the slave's favor whereas the national court did not. This fact alone helps to augment the contention that early Iowa gave substantial evidence of antislavery leanings.
To be completely fair to estabhshed historioi^raphy, it should be noted that at the time of the Ralph decision there was a serious confrontation between Iowa and Missouri over the boundary between them. It is possible to argue that the Iowa court's ruling may have represented nothing more than a desire to deprive a Missourian of his property. However, such motivation does not become judicial rol>es, and the tribmial would be expected to act accordingly. But more importantly, the boundary dispute had not yet reached its peak of intensity, and, furthermore. Congress was even then intervening to settle it.
Perhaps a more logical argument against accepting the Ralph Case as indicative of a widespread antislavery sentiment in Iowa could be made if one maintained that the court's decision merely represented the thinking of a three-man minority which happened to occupy a locus of power. Tliis line of reasoning would hold that the Black " Easton Morris (ed. Gode more accurately indicated official and, probably, unofficial attitudes in early Iowa since the Code was the result of an elected, and therefore representative, assembly.
However, if one is seeking antislavery expressions in an elected body, it is only necessary-to look forward five years to the debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1844. This elected assembly met to draft a document which would usher Iowa into Statehood. If the delegates selected by their fellow citizens can be considered representative, then their actions relative to the place of the Black in the State were revealing.
Proceedings opened in Iowa City in the summer of 1844, and from the beginning, a surprisingly liberal spirit was evident. One of the first questions raised in the Convention concemed the status of the Negro. Certain unknown delegates had boldly issued a petition to grant the Black man in Iowa full citizenship-including .suffrage. Significantly, tliis audacious step, occurring just five years after the passage of the Black Code, was received as a legitimate subject of debate. The Assembly appointed a committee to deliberate upon the question and recommend action. The actual decision of that committee was probably a foregone conclusion, but the olnioiis honesty and candor of its report tells much about the attitudes of early !o\\a on the whole Black problem.
The committee allowed that all men were created equal, and that the concept should apply to Blacks as well as whites; however, the foregoing was a mere abstract proposition, and, althoiif^h strictlv tnie, when applied to man in a stat:.' of nature, yet it ht'cinnrs very miich modified when man is considerctt in the artifidal state in wliicli govern ment and society plaees him.'" Holding the Convention to be an attempt by the \\'liite population to form a State govemment and that the members should \iew it in terms of white self-interest, the committee asked, "Can the negro tliose privileges ( of political citizenship ) and not impair tlie rights of whites?"" The decision it reached maintained that, "the negro (sic) not being a party to the govemment has not right to partake of its privileges."^Ô ne niight say that all this moral philosophizing was irrelevant since the egahtarian and legalizing verbiage served simply as a preamble to an expression of racism and proslavery attitudes. But that the petition to grant Black suffrage came to the floor and that the Convention felt called upon to respond seems highly significant, for a racist Assembly would ha\e been better advised to ignore the whole issue. It cannot t>e too strongly nottid that the whole tenor of the committee report was an open repudiation of the concept of inherent Black inferiority. It viewed the denial of citizenship to Negroes as an unfortunate, but necessary step to preserve the prerogati\'es of whites-a position candidly admitted in the highly illuminating statement which closed the report:
However your committee may commisserate with the degraded condition of the negroes (sic) and feel for his fate, yet we ean never consent to open the doors of our heiuitiful State and invite him to settle in our lands. The policy of the other States would drive the whole black population of the Union upon us.''' This excerpt rivals Dodge's statement in the clarity with which it delineates the mood of escapism prevalent in early Iowa. The committee admitted certain antislavery leanings, and even a liberal sympathy with the plight of the Black freeman but it so strongly desired non-involvement in the controversy that it refused to allow political expression to its more humanitarian tendencies. The Constitution adopted by the Assembly in the summer of 1844 made citizenship a "whites only" proposition.
The voters of Iowa twice rejected this Constitution-once on April 7, 1845, and again on August 4 of that year. Neither " Ibit}., p. 54.
slavery nor racism had anytliing to do with those rejections, however. Finally, in the summer of 1846, another convention assembled at Iowa City to prepare a second constitution. This time the delegates did not even admit the question of Black citizenship as a topic of debate.
The voters ratified this second constitution in December 1846, and Iowa became a State. Statehood, however, while representing a change in political status for Iowans, had little or no effect on popular attitudes. Most citizens of the fledgling State held devoutly to their position of philosophic antislavery paradoxically expressed by "head-in-the-s and" escapism.
Through all this period of disengagement, a foundation of hostility to slavery was being established. A minute but flourishing segment of the State's population disavowed the timidity of its fellow citizens and promoted an open defiance of the Southern institution. Not surprisingly, this vocal element in Iowa came largely from the religious community.
An example of this religious clement was the preWously mentioned village of Salem. Founded in 1835 by a group of Virginia Friends, the little town had always abhorred human bondage, but in 1837, a family came to Salem who put its beliefs constantly to the test. Tliis was the Frazicr family, led by their dynamic patriarch, Thomas Clarkson Frazier. These new settlers were not satisfied with meekly expressing antislavery sentiments. By 1845 tlie stridence with which they maintained their militancy had polarized the town into two camps, both hostile to slavery, but in turn, hostile to each other. As a result of this schism, tlie town elders expelled the Frazier faction from the community meeting house and forced them to set up their own church and burial ground.
The e.vpiilsion merely gave the Frazier group more freedom with which to pursue their aims, and Salem s pro.\-imity to the Missouri border predetermined tlie obvious course of antislavery expression open to the militants-involvement in tlie Underground Railroad. Tlie record of their participation in this famous system was one of the earliest in the State. The abolitionist parson was clearly tlie head of Congregational councils in Iowa, even after that denomination had sent several other strong-willed ministers into the Territory. As leader of the church. Turner used his influence to bring his brethren into the battle against slavery. In 1840 the Congregational Church in the Territory formed the Iowa Association to function as its policy-making and administrative arm. The first meeting took place in Denmark under Turner's chairmanship.
Following the organizational meeting of 1840, the Association tumed to regular business at the Second Annual Meeting in 1841. One of its first decisions was to attack Iowa's recently passed Black Code. On November 6, the Committee on the Religious Destitution of the Territory, headed by Turner, reported out the following resolution:
WHEREAS: the laws in relation tn blacks and mulattoes are in our opinion a violation of the principles of justice and the laws of Clod; oppressive in their operation on ailoied perst)ns, and forbidding us arts of humanity; therefore, RESOL\'ED: that we invite our churches to unite with us in petitioning for their repeal.''
•* |. B. Chase (register). Minutes of the General AssocUttion of Congressiotial Churches and Ministers of the State of Iowa: 1S40-1875
(Hull, Iowa: Advance Print, 1888), p. 9.
Almost as though the imphcations inherent in the 1841 resolution were not a sufficiently explicit pronouncement of antislavery sentiments. Turner led the Iowa Association one step further. On Sept. 15, 1843, during the Fourth Annual Meeting, he chaired a Committee on Slavery which declared:
We regard slavery, as it exists in this country, as a heinous sin, and a gross violation of the laws and Gospel of C^hrist. . . . We would call upon our fellow Christians of every name to unite with us to cío away with lefjaiized oppression, and lead man to love his fdlow man. . . . We also feel bound in duty to withdraw fellowship from tlïose who profess to be Christians, and still hold their fellowmen in bondage.^T liis "witlidrawal of fellowship' is reminisoent of Salem's coercing its slaveholdiiig brother into selling his property. Both cases were far in advance of their time and represent a brand of militancy not quite palatable for most Iowans of that day. But that militancy did exist, and the number who subscrilied to it grew steadily.
Of this subtly growing element of antislavery militants the most easily recognizable was the famous "Iowa Band." This group of 11 graduating students from Andover Theological Seminar)' had decided to come West to begin their Congregational ministries, as they felt they were most needed there. Praying for guidance, the pilgrims "heard a call" to the farthest frontier settlements. Dismissing such possiblities as Ohio, Michigan, IHinois and Wisconsin as too settled, and therefore not in great need, the debate narrowed to Missouri and Iowa. In eliminating the former, the following dialogue purportedly took place: pulpit and in his letters. Probably the tmest representation of liis feelings came in his intense correspondence with his fiancee, Mary Ann MacKintire of Charlestown, Massachusetts. Written between 1845 and 1846, Salter's letters contain many remarks on the current agitation over the controversy and reveal his deeply troubled mind. He knew where he stood on the question of slavery, but he recognized as well tlie possible implications of a forceful application of his ideals to his personal life. On Jan. 1, 1846, he wrote Mary Ann that he did not like the monomaniacal self-righteousness of some of his colleagues, noting that "though an abolitionist, God forbid that I should make opinions different from mine a test of ministerial fellowship."" Salter should be classified exactly as he described himself, an abolitionist. Yet there was an element of uncertainty in the young minister which probably typified to some extent the larger ni(K>d of Iowa's incoming population. The pioneer land-seekers were simply not that sure of their stand on sla\ery, or rather they were not sure of the course which their position seemed to demand of them. To avoid taking action, they fled to any haven they could find, and Iowa seemed to suit that purpose.
But where the uncertainty' of the settlers expressed itself in escapism, that of Salter and his Congregational colleagues was largely suppressed. Haven-hunting was not their motivation. Tliey came to labor, and for most of them tliat labor included moral warfare against slavery. In 1848 another New England parson came to Iowa to open a church. The Rev. John Todd, the new pastor of Tabor, a town in the southwest comer of the State, would figure largely in the antislavery movement in Iowa. In his autobiography, Todd recalled his trip up the Missouri River on a steamboat, und the violent denunciation he faced when he told a fellow-passenger "that the slaves in oiucountry had a much better reason for rising and fightinĝ for their freedom than our fathers ever had."'" Iowa obviously had another fire-brand on its hands.
This cataloguing of incoming antislavery militants must not be taken as a dominant feature of the State's settlement. The true, detennined antislavery movement in Iowa really began in 1854. Prior to tliat year, the State vacillated between her two overriding desires-to escape and to conciliate. Almost every event touching upon slavery during tliose years held elements of one or both of these two drives. The greatest single expression of antislavery sentiment in the pre-1854 period, tbe Salem fugitive slave ease, ultimately demonstrated Iowa's dilemma.
Sometime around June 2, 1848, nine slaves owned by a Ruel Daggs of Clark county, Missouri, escaped and made their way north into Iowa. Two slave-catcbers named Slaughter and McClure came in hot pursuit, and cornered the runaways in the woods a mile south of Salem. The captors seized their quarry and began retracing their steps toward Missouri when they were stopped by tbree militant Quakers, Thomas Clarkson Frazier, Elihu Frazier and William JohnsorL One of the three militants demanded that tlie Negroes be taken to the Justice of the Peace in Salem to be identified as fugitives before being returned to Missouri. Another was more direct, vowing tliat he would "wade in Missouri blood before the Negroes should be taken."'^ Outnumbered and in a strange State, Slaughter and McClure surrendered to the demand of a court appearance.
Wliile the party advanced toward town, news of their impending arrival somehow preceded tliem and Salem turned out en masse. Slaughter Uitcr reported that the town was "unanimous" that he not return the slaves to Daggs. This alone is arresting since the community was supposedlŷ^ divided between "militants' and "moderates." The townspeople surrounded the slave-catchers, issuing threats and insults, and in the confusion several of the slaves vanished into the crowd.
When the remaining party reached Salem, the office of Justice of the Peace Nelson Gibbs proved too small for the woiild-be audience. The harried Missiourians were forced to face the ultimate irony of having their hearing moved to the Fraziers' spacious Abolition Meeting House. In the tumultuous examination, Slaughter and McCluro admitted that they had no warrants while Cibbs finally decided he had no jurisdiction. In the general bedlam another Quaker, Paul Way, led one party of slaves to waiting horses, and Thomas Frazier took those remaining to his home.
The affair at Salem might l>e misleading, however, since the Quaker village was definitely not representative of Iowa as a whole in 1848. Even Salem's moderates would have been considered militant by the standards of most Iowans. Furthermore, the press of the State was unanimous in its condemnation of the town.
Press censure was not the last chapter in the Daggs affair. In 1850 the slaveowner brought suit in Federal Court at Burlington against those most closely involved in the loss of his slaves. Daggs sought $10,000 in damages as compensation for his niissing chattels. Strangely enough, he chose the avowed antislavery lawyer, David Rorer, to represent him. In defense of the attorney's appearance on the Southern side of the moral issue at this time, it can only be said that Rorer's case for Daggs lacked the vigor and passion of his defense of Ralph. Moreover, he presented Constitutional rather than ethical arguments. The Frazier faction was represented by J. C. Hall and J. T. Morton.
From the beginning the conduct of tlie trial exliibited a "kid-gloves" approach, an evaluation strengthened by Judge J. J. Dyer's commendation to counsel for handling an explosive suit with dignity and restraint. During the proc-^edings most witnesses seemed reluctant to take a definite stand on the town's actions, and many maintained that Slaughter and McClure had never documented their claims at the time. While Hall and Morton hammered bome this last point, Rorer just elicited what sketchy testimony he could.
Rorer made no move to counter any defense argument. His case consisted of taking Slaughter's testimony, casually cross-examining a few witnesses, then placing his client's claim before the jury. On sheer merit, there were enough loopholes in the plaintiffs case for any jury with antislavery tendencies to dismiss the suit if they so desired. But this jury did not dismiss it. After two hours of deliberation, they returned with a $2900 award for Daggs.
It appears that the Burlington jury may have held proslavery sympathies. However, Rorer's plea to them offers another interpretation. Like many Iowans, David Rorer had come to free-soil to escape contact witli the slavery question. But for the previous four years Iowa bad been a State, and she had assumed certain responsibilities to the country. She was bound in law to her fellow States, and shared with them the common heritage of the U. S. Constitution. Much as Rorer might detest slavery and desire to escape it, there came a time, as in tbe Daggs case, when it forced itself upon the citizenry of the new State. At such times sectional angers flared and antislavery advocates like Rorer were forced to ch(x>se l>etween their desire to strike out at a system they abhorred and their desire to preserve the harmony of the Union. Reluctantly, they chose the Union. The moral duty demanded by the Constitution overrode their ethical hostility to slavery. To save the Union from further discord, they chose to placate the Soutli in obedience to the legal contract which united them. Along with Senator Dodge they seemed to say, "Just so far as Blacks have entered into the Constitution we are for them."
Conciliation and constitutionality, then, framed Rorer's whole attack. He candidly told the jury that the facts of the case were patently obvious and there could be no begging tlie question. Iowans, as citizens of a responsible State, had a duty to live up to their legal contract, the U. S. Constitution, which they had knowingly accepted. That contract recognized slavery. Placing the decision in clear philosophic perspective for the jury, Rorer asked:
Shall we now repudiate the contract we have made-shall we be the first to violate it? Shall we affirm tliat there is a moral law above this, and that we must obey it at all hazards? Shall we be permitted to prate about morals and sympathy with canting hypocrits or maddened fanaties, when we ourselves sanctioned tbe institution of slavery by entering, with full knowledge, into a contrac-t of which it forms a part?^" It appears that Rorer recognized a general antislavery feeling in the jur\', and that he forced them to see beyond the question of the Daggs claim to the higher legal duty of abiding by the Constitution.
The Daggs decision gave the first indication of how seriously involved Iowa was in the moral dilemma of antislavery versus union. On the local scene the nearness of Missouri gave her the problem of dealing with fugitive slaves. On the national level sectional discord riddled the two chambers of Congress and constantly forced Iowa to take sides. Until 1854 she continued to choose the course of conciliation based upon constitutionality, but it was becoming a progressively less satisfying choice since conciliation only seemed to whet the appetite of sectional interests.
No single piece of national legislation demonstrated Iowa's dilemma more graphically than the Compromise of 1850. These enactments vi'ere but one more futile effort to soothe sectional hostility and ease tensions. Among other things, the Compromise was a series of bills dealing with lands gained in the Mexican War. The Missouri Compromise 30 years earlier had set a 36" 30' line between slave and free territory, but extension of that line proved impossible when California applied for admission to Statehood witli a free-soil constitution. California lay well below the old compromise line. In the storm of sectional reaction which foUowed, Henry Clay offered a proposal to end the controversy. California would be accepted on its own terms, which naturally pleased the North; a new and all-encompassing fugitive slave law would be enacted as a concession ="' ¡hid., p. 25.
to the South; and, most importantly, the remainder of the old Mexican Empire would be divided without respect to slaver)'. In other words, the new territories were to decide on slavery for themselves according to the nature of their settlement. By this concept, dubbed "squatter sovereignty," Clay hoped to short-circuit future sectional ho.stility over parcelling out land.
The idea of letting the people of the distant westem settlements decide the slavery question for themselves naturally satisfied most Iowans. Not only was it democratic, but also the area was geographically far removed from the State so EI S not to cause concem. The old Wilmot Proviso which sought to ban slavery in the new territories could then be comfortably dismissed. The fugitive slave law was less easy to accept, but Iowa preferred not having rumxway Blacks around to botlier its conscience, and the new law might discourage Negroes from making the break for freedom. Tlien too, tl^e new law did no more than update an old one the South had always used. It was a good way to restore hamiony in the harried Union, and hamiony remained something Iowa wanted most desperately-as the generally favorable press reaction to the Compromise clearly indicated.
Only one ominous note interrupted the general accord on the Compromise. At the Tentli Annual Meeting of the Iowa Association in June 1850, Asa Tumer pushed through another "testimony upon slavery" which openly challenged tlie currently debated fugitive slave law. Tlie Association maintained:
The principles of civil and religious liberty forbid our acknowledging the right of property in man or the obligation of any law re({uiring us to aid in the delivering up of fugitives from oppression."' This "testimony" all but invited Congregationalists to join the Underground Railroad, an invitation many of the brethren were later to accept.
Finally, there were two more items touching upon Iowa's pre-1854 racial attitudes. In February 1851, the legislature codified existing legal practices into one volume. In chapter 130, section 2388, on "Evidence," the new code declared that any person capable of understanding tlie obligation of an oath could give evidence, except that "an Indian, a negro (sic), a mulatto, or a black person shall not be allowed to give testimony in any cause wherein a white person is a party.'"^T lie second event occurred in antislavery Tabor, John Todd's pastorate. In 1850 a Negro family named Canier came to town. They were apparently pleasant and industrious people who had worked hard to purchase tlieir freedom, and then had come to a free State to enjoy it. The humanitarian Rev. Todd naively invited the Caniers* children to attend both day school and Sunday School, and they cheerefully accepted. At that point the presumptuous cleric leamed just how deep Tabor's liberality ran, for, as he described it:
Iinmediatt'ly up bounded the race que.stion, which was soon practically solved by the incendiary burning of the school house, the only place in the entire settlement where either school or meeting could be held.^N either case, however, involved any particular proslavery sentiment. The Black testimony law represented nothing more than a vestigial carry-over from the racism expressed in the Black Code of 11 years previous. As for the school burning, it was obviously a racist matter since Tabor had a known antishivery reputation.
In total, then, Iowa's pre-1854 history exhibited the conscious desire of its citizenry to escape contact with slavery and the Negro, despite basic antislavery learnings. Iowans therefore resented abolitionists because they interfered with this escapism. Yt^t when forced to come to grips with the Black problem, Iowa was ethically torn. Where possible, the state would prefer expressing its more humanitarian side, but if pushed too far it would safely align itself with the forces of conciliation and legality-even against the urgings of its conscience.
"^ The Code of Iowa, 1851 (Iowa City: Palmer and Paul, State Printers, 1851; reprint Des Moines: Emery H. English, State Printer, 1912), p. 239. " Todd, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Conciliation proved an inadec^uate course in the long run. It had a way of demanding more and more of the soul of antislavery Iowans. When the Kansas-Nebraska Bill went before the Congress of the United States, the whole foundation upon which Iowa had buit its escapist haven crumbled. The Missiouri Compromise was repealed and Iowa felt betrayed.
KANSAS-NEBRASKA AND lAMES GRIMES:
THE TURNING POINT
In one of tíiose rare examples of historical irony, Iowa's conciliatory Senator A. C. Dodge opened the door on the act which ended his State's uneasy aloofness toward the slavery question. At the same time he unleashed the forces at home which were to topple him from his premier position on the political ladder of Iowa. Oddly enough. Dodge had no notion of what lay ahead and was stiniatized by a situation which simply got beyond his control.
On Dec. 14, 1853, Iowa's senior senator introduced a bill to organize the Territory of Nebraska. Tliis had long been one of the dearest projects of Dodge's fellow-Democrat and political ally. Senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois. Yet it was natural that an Iowan should introduce the bill, since it would put civilization on his State's western border and end the War Department's policy of using the area as a repository for Indians. Also, since Douglas dreamed of putting a railroad through that area. Dodge knew that Iowa would likewise be crossed by the route. However, Douglas' objective hf.d always eluded him because of the concerted opposition of the South. They naturally wanted no part of anotlier free-state in the Union, as the Missouri Compromise provided that Nebraska should be. Also, Southerners wanted any American expansion, especially railroads, directed toward the Southwest.
All evidence pointed to Dodge's bill meeting the same fate as all his colleague's attempts, but this time Douglas moved to stymie Southern objections by offering them a proposition they could not refuse. From his position as Chairman of the Committee on Territories, the Illinois Senator revised Dodge's bill so that it came out with an article allowing squatter sovereignty on the slavery issue to be applied to certain areas of the Louisiana Purchase. Specifically, it proposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and offered slave-owners access to the newly-created Nebraska and Kansas Territories with tlieir human chattel. As a result, these areas would be open to the e.xpansion of the slave system just as the old Mexican lands had been by the passage of tbe Compromise of 1850. In short, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill merely sought to extend tlie previous compromise, and all the rhetorical moralizing about the sovereignty of the people which Clay's bill had elicited applied equally to Douglas' proposal.
Wben Iowa had chosen to be eonciliatory and support the Compromise of 1850., it had done so knowing that squatter sovereignty might conceivably allow for the expansion of slavery into new but distant territory. However, if slavery spread to the SouUiwest, at least it would not intrude upon Iowa's aloofness from the problem, and perhaps it would quiet the incessant sectional bickering. Whatever Iowa's earlier ambivalence, the whole structure of moral non-involvement came tumbling down wben Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act in May 1854. Now the free-state might very possibly find slavery on two of its borders instead of one. All that its conciliation of tbe South had accomplished was to forge the weapon whereby the South had destroyed the main prop of Iowa's isolation, the Missouri Compromise line. Missouri's runaway slaves had already intruded upon Iowa's unea.sy conscience; a slavestate to the west would make confrontation inescapable. It was little wonder that tbe free-state population felt betrayed. With the old compromise repealed, there was nothing but Iowa's own amendable constitution to keep slavery from entering the State itself. Few Iowans probabl)' took such an eventuality seriously, yet such was their anger that they listened willingly to leading political figures who sounded the alann over the possibility.
The State responded immediately to tbe bill's passage by entering into the slavery controversy with vengeance. The same Iowa which had given a sla\eovvner a favorable judgment against some of its owai citizens, which had codified an anti-Negro testimony provision and which had endorsed a compromise supposedly congenial to slave interests, would no longer play the constitutionalist appeaser. The State had gone against its inherent antislavery conscience and was now expected to watch die system move into the house next door. This time Iowans would have none of it. They would fight back, and even legality would not overly concern them. This new strident militancy, aroused by Kansas-Nebraska, did not result from any dramatic shift in population make-up over the four year span between 18.50 and 1854. Kather Iowa's natural antislavery tendencies surfaced behind the repudiation of constitutional restraint. Iowans had tried to fulfill their moral duty to their national contract, but in doing so, they had netted nothing. Now, with the pragmatic spur of self-interest in regard to the settlement of tlieir neighboring territories, they would set aside fine points of constitutionality and listen more sympathetically to the arguments of native antislavery advocates, whether they spoke from the press or the pulpit. Finding Iowa's press largely ranged against the KansasNebraska Act, and most Iowans up in amis, it was inevitable that someone would make political capital of the situation, especially since 1854 was an election year. With the Democratic Party so closely tied to the hated piece of legislation, eyes naturally turned to the Whigs. Always a minority party in the State, the Whigs had been crushed in the election of 1852. Kansas-Nebraska gave them a chance to "come out of the political wilderness," and they took advantage of it. Ironiciilly, the election of 1854 also witnessed the party's demise, for within two years their "Moses" had defected to the new Republican camp and had taken the State with him. This young Moses was the intense, antislavery lawyer from Burlington, James W. Grimes.
James Grimes
In early Febmary 1854, during tlie debate of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill in Congress, tlie Whig Party of Iowa held its largest political convention. Casting aside the old faces of tlie party, the assembly chose instead tlie articulate Crimes. Douglas' act would be the central issue of the campaign., and Crimes rarely deviated from that course. From the time he climbed on the stump until he left tlie State House for the U. S. Senate in 1857, the Kansas question consumed his energies.
But Crimes was to be more than a Wliig candidate-a fact which may partly explain his defection to tiie Republicans. Many Whigs were unable to condone his more militant antislavery positions, and could not back him strongly. Almost at once. Grimes began seeking out like-minded men. William Penn Clarke, a devoted antislavery advocate, became one of the first to ally híjiiself to his party's candidate in a closer bond than political necessity would demand. Grimes wrote specifically for his help on April 3, 1854, and Clarke tjuickly responded. Others, like D. C. Cloud and J. W. Cattell also joined the growing coterie, their unbending antislavery philosophy uniting them aU.
However, these men would have joined Grimes' campaign in any case. More important was the alliance he fomied with the Denmark cleric, Asa Turner, who had emerged over the years as one of the leading figures in the Free Soil Party of Iowa. The party was small but morally influential in die State, and its support would mean a good deal to the Whig nominee.
On March 28, 1854, tlie Free Soil Convention opened in Crawfordsville with Denmark's Isaac Field presiding. Turner's confidant and future biographer, Ceorge Magoun, attended the convention with the parson and recorded the proceedings. He described tho conclave as botli troubled and tumultuous. Grimes' nomination by the Whigs had stolen Free Soil thunder, yet they were not completely satisfied as to his antislavery credentials. While the confused debate rumbled on. Turner, who had been appointed chairman of the platform committee, busied himself drafting the solution to the whole problem. The platfomi he submitted was proba!>ly one of the most succinct on record:
Whcrca-s: ( 1 ) The Free Soil Party gave the Whig lawyer its endorsement. Thus, with one convulsive upheaval, the Kansas-Nebraska Act had totally realigned politics in Iowa. Though still marching under old political banners, the new orders in Iowa were actually made up of free-soil and antislavery adherents ranged against a confused and uncomfortable agglomeration of proslavers and old-line conciliators.
On April 8, 1854, Crimes issued a broadside explaining his position in the coming campaign. The broadside is one of Iowa's most remarkable historical documents. It opened by noting that, should the Missouri (Compromise be repealed, botli Kansas and Nebraska would be flooded with slaveholders. Then came a most significant appraisal of Iowa's situation:
If there is one State in the l^nion more interested tiiim anotlier in the maintenance of the Missouri Compromise, it is the State of Iowa. With a free, enterprising population on the west, our State will be \astly benefited by an early organization of Nebraska. With a sla\e State on our western border, I see notliuig hut trouble aud darkucss in tlie future. Roumled on two sides by slave States, we shall be intersected with underground railroads, and shall hf continually tlistractwl hy slavehunts. Instead of having a population at tlic west w'ho will sympathizL' with us, we shall find their sympathies and interests constantly antagonistic to ours.^"'^ But perhaps the most significant section of the whole broadside came m his brusque dismissal of the charge that he was an abolitionist:
I am aware that for entertaining these opinions of the Nebraska (]iiestioi], and for fearlessly expressing tliem, I am denounced in some (quarters as an abolitionist. I heed not the .senst'lfs*; charge. It is too late in the day for any man to be deterred troni expressing his opinions hy the mad-dog cry of alwihtionisni. I do not attempt or desire to interfere with slavery in the slave-holding States. I am content that the slave-holders of the South ma\' possess their slaves, and be responsible for their control over tliem to their own laws, and to their own consciences. I will not even prestime to jndge them. But, witli the hle.ssing of God, I will war and war eontinually against the abandonment to slaven-' of a single foot of soil now consecrated to freedom. . . . And I here declare that whilst I am as anxious as any man, for the sp('e<ly organization of the newTerritories, yet I will not only everywhere and at all times oppose their organization nncler a bill allowing the introduction of slavery, bnt should the present bill pass, I will ¡idvocati-its repeal and oppose the admission of Nebraska and Kansas into the Union as slave states.'**' Though Crimes denied being an abolitionist, the fact remains that the charge did not particularly disturb him. Also, the broadside finnly establis.hed a position which Iowa officially adopted from that point right on down to the Ci\al War-"slavery where it exists, but not one inch further." More importantly, this pronouncement was the first by a major political figure in Iov\a to imply an open abhorrance of slavery.
If Crimes' statements occasionally sound rather paranoic, it can only be said tliat tensions ran high and that such declarations merely reflected those tensions. Beyond that there is the fact tliat some of his more flamboyant predictions proved surprisingly prophetic. For example, at the time there would probably have been many scoffers at the notion that Iowa would become "intersected with underground railroads;" yet that is precisely what happened. Prior to 1854 hostility to the return of fugitive slaves centered mainly iii Quaker Salem and Yankee Demnark, at least in so far as the later admissions of involved personnel indicate such hostility. Even in those towns the URR
•' '• Ibid. activity was unspecific and undocumented, with tbe exception of the Daggs case. But 1854 was the year of decision. Every county history with URR activity to record, dates the opening of its stations at that year or just after it. Because 1854 is so recun^ent, it defies eoincidence.
In November of this pivotal year. Grimes carried the State, and his Whig-Free Soil coahtion took a majority into the State assembly. On Dec. 9, 1854, he gave his inaugural address before the new legislature. His speech clarified his basic ho.stHity both to slavery and to the implications of the Kansas-Nebraska Act:
Slavery is a local institution, depending wholly on State hiws for its existonee ;ind continuance. Freodom heing the natural eondition of all men, and no authority beiiif; delegated to the General Government to establish or protect slavery. Congress Ciin pass no law establisliíny or protec-ting it in the territorio. ^T he new governor of Iowa was definitely sincere about his antislavery leanings, and proclaimed himself a force to contend with in the future.
Crimes was somewhat more militant than even his publie pronouneements revealed him to l>e-perhaps even militant enough to be classed as an abolitionist. For several years the Burlington lawyer-politician had carried on an extensive correspondence with Salmon P. Chase. Included in this exchange was that highly provocative letter excerpted by Herriott which puiported to demonstrate a large element of proslaveiy sentiment in Iowa.
On Oct. 3, 1854, Grimes did indeed write Chase that he believed that, "The Southem half of our State is strongly prosla\'ery. . . ."-" But the impact of this peculiar statement is ameliorated by two considerations: first. Crimes wrote the letter just prior to his election as go\'ernor on an unconditional free-soil platform; and secondly, when taken as a whole the letter reveals a eondition in tlie State exactly the opposite of what the carefully edited excerpt portrays: ' The southern half of our State is strongly proslavery, but I think we will be able to carry a majority with us for free principles, and for a diseonnectioii with slavery. The Whigs are just now learning that it does not hurt them to be called "abolitionists," "wooly-heads," etc., and. when the great contest of 1856 comes on, they will be prepared For and callous to such epithets. The north third of our State will be to Iowa, politically, what the Western Reserve is to tlie State of Ohio. No man can obtain the electoral vote of Iowa, in 1856, who wa.s in favor of the passage of the Nebraska bill, and who will not favor the repeal of the "Fugitive Slave Law."^"
In its entirety, this ambiguous letter, rather than indicating a substantial proslavery sentiment in Iowa, reveals a majorit\' for the opposing position. One can only wonder if Grimes' use of the term proslavery did not refer to someone not quite as militant as himself.
On Nov. 13, 1854, Chase answered Grimes' letter, and in doing so he showed plainly that he thought the Iowan to be something more tlian a moderate free-soiler:
It does me good to tliink that a New Hamp.shire boy (N. H. was the native State of Ixtth Grimes and Chase), and a governor of a Western State, will bave tbe honor of being the first to lay down the great principle on which tbe slavery question must be finally settled, if peacefully Siittled at alL^" Clearly, Chase was thinking the untliinkable -that the confrontation between slavery and freedom might necessarily become violent. It is significant that he should share these thoughts with Grimes, and that doing so did not seem to bother the Iowan or cool his alliance with his Ohio mentor.
Chase was ultimately correct, the confrontation would be violent. But Bull Run was not rcially the first bloody field of the "irrepressible conflict;" rather the plains of Kansas were to ha\'e that dubious honor. Wlien it was evident that .slaxery and antislavery would battle for supremacy in the Kansas Territory, Iowa stood hopelessly in die middle. As Missouri became the natural highway of the slavocracy into the contested area, so Iowa hosted the antislavery migration. And there, willingly in tíie thick of it, was Iowa's James W. Grimes. His name would head the roster of political leaders in tlie great free-soil movement.^ Salter, Crimes, op. cit., p. 54.° Ibid., p. .55.
